ESDEarth System DynamicsESDEarth Syst. Dynam.2190-4987Copernicus PublicationsGöttingen, Germany10.5194/esd-7-89-2016Perspectives on contextual vulnerability in discourses of climate conflictOkparaU. T.uche4purpose@yahoo.co.ukStringerL. C.DougillA. J.Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UKAgricultural Economics Department, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, NigeriaU. T. Okpara (uche4purpose@yahoo.co.uk)8February201671891029November201514December201526January201628January2016This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/This article is available from https://esd.copernicus.org/articles/7/89/2016/esd-7-89-2016.htmlThe full text article is available as a PDF file from https://esd.copernicus.org/articles/7/89/2016/esd-7-89-2016.pdf
The science of climate security and conflict is replete with controversies.
Yet the increasing vulnerability of politically fragile countries to the
security consequences of climate change is widely acknowledged. Although
climate conflict reflects a continuum of conditional forces that coalesce
around the notion of vulnerability, how different portrayals of
vulnerability influence the discursive formation of climate conflict
relations remains an exceptional but under-researched issue. This paper
combines a systematic discourse analysis with a vulnerability interpretation
diagnostic tool to explore (i) how discourses of climate conflict are
constructed and represented, (ii) how vulnerability is communicated across
discourse lines, and (iii) the strength of contextual vulnerability against
a deterministic narrative of scarcity-induced conflict, such as that
pertaining to land. Systematically characterising climate conflict
discourses based on the central issues constructed, assumptions about
mechanistic relationships, implicit normative judgements and vulnerability
portrayals, provides a useful way of understanding where discourses differ.
While discourses show a wide range of opinions “for” and “against”
climate conflict relations, engagement with vulnerability has been less
pronounced – except for the dominant context centrism discourse concerned about human
security (particularly in Africa). In exploring this discourse, we observe
an increasing sense of contextual vulnerability that is oriented towards a
concern for complexity rather than predictability. The article concludes by
illustrating that a turn towards contextual vulnerability thinking will help
advance a constructivist theory-informed climate conflict scholarship that
recognises historicity, specificity, and variability as crucial elements of
contextual totalities of any area affected by climate conflict.
Introduction
Several accounts of the relations between climate change and conflict are
organised around three sets of ideas: “trends in climatic events”,
“presence of conflict triggers” and “dynamics of intervening variables”.
Extreme climatic events are increasing in several regions of the world
(IPCC, 2014). They are envisaged as driving natural disasters and resource
scarcity, and causing huge material destruction, challenging livelihoods, and
spurring widespread economic downturn (Buhaug et al., 2008). Conflict
triggers, such as random acts of group clashes and a history of ethnic and
religious tensions, are held to combine and exacerbate the social impacts of
climate change (Adger, 2010). Intervening variables (e.g. poverty,
marginalisation, and inequality), which are linked to conflict triggers, are
equally thought to define and shape how climate change and conflict emerge
and combine (Papaioannou, 2016). These ideas have not gone unchallenged.
Several studies suggesting a link between climate change and conflict have
been extensively critiqued on both theoretical and empirical grounds as
either being climate-centric with disproportionate focus on environmental
determinism (Raleigh et al., 2014), or framed around threats posed to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state to promote the
political and military interests and development agendas of certain
governments (Von Lucke et al., 2014). Yet, these ideas have remained
dominant in academic and policy circles, and mainstream scholarship oriented
to critiquing the ideas has been less concerned about proposing alternative
portrayals of the climate change and conflict issue. In particular, there
has been little attempt to pin down the categories of voices articulating
whether climate change poses a pressing security threat, and how portrayals
of vulnerability influence the discursive formation of the issue. There is a
need to investigate these aspects to better advance the discussion on how to
address the imbalances in climate conflict knowledge production, especially
in relation to land use pathways to conflict under climatic changes.
This paper develops a new way of understanding the varying contentions
amongst climate conflict discourses using discourse components typical of
the broad sweep of the environmental security discourses (Adger et al.,
2001; Dryzek, 2005). Specifically, it is concerned with how particular
interpretations of vulnerability (see Kelly and Adger, 2000; Füssel,
2007; O'Brien et al., 2007) enable or constrain the representation of
climate conflict discourses. Discourse here is conceived as a historically
emergent collection of shared ideas and practices for apprehending and
comprehending climate change and conflict. Crucially, discourses of climate
conflict are often articulated either based on the referent object(s) whose
security is threatened under climate disruptions (McDonald, 2013) or framed
to tease out whether or not climate change is a factor in conflict outcomes
(Scheffran et al. 2012b). In other cases, they are framed broadly around
notions of “environmental conflict” and “environmental security”
(Detraz, 2011). There has been no previous analysis of how framing of
climate conflict links as a vulnerability-based question can adequately feed
into the ways the links are understood.
This paper argues that different theoretical conceptualisation of the
character of climate change and conflict interactions is a manifestation of
a limited understanding of the degree and/or nature of overlap and distinction
between the terms “threats” and “vulnerabilities”. Although climate
change can be a threat and also a source of vulnerability, its framing as a
threat is contingent upon its capacity to drive vulnerability. Threats
denote danger that is imminent or approaching, while vulnerabilities imply a
demanding condition or state of weakness or powerlessness, and may not
always imply a threatening one (see O'Neil, 2011, 24–32). Therefore, a
useful way to engage with climate conflict would be to transition from
threat-centred thinking to concern about vulnerabilities (Detraz, 2011),
where climate change is recognised and assessed first as an “accelerant of
vulnerabilities” in linked climate conflict outcomes, before its portrayal
as a “threat multiplier” (see Jasparro and Taylor, 2008, p. 237). This
way, vulnerability can be applied to understand the myriad of hidden
contextual conditions (i.e. the bright spots and black holes) in climate-conflict links, and for
framing responses to conflict, including climate and land-based adaptation
and conflict mitigation (Scheffran et al., 2012a; Busby et al., 2014a, b).
In much of the climate conflict discourses, there is no reference to a
specific interpretation of vulnerability. Since climate conflict reflects a
continuum of conditional forces that coalesce around the notion of
vulnerability (Ludwig et al., 2011), we posit that how vulnerability is
embedded in the discourses must, therefore, be interpreted and understood
through research arguments, illustrative questions, prioritised focal points
and particular methodologies in bodies of texts and debates (O'Brien et al.,
2007). This perspective informs the vulnerability interpretation diagnostic
tool applied in this research. The research identifies discourse categories
by laying out discrete expressions that depict homogeneity in messages
regarding the (i) roles of climate change in conflict outcomes,
(ii) perceptions regarding the referent object whose security is threatened, and
(iii) how frameworks of meaning about vulnerability are portrayed (i.e. the
vulnerability interpretations underpinning climate conflict discourses).
This approach allows for a less subjective search for and characterisation
of discourses. As such, it represents a significant departure from most
previous efforts to understand the discursive construction of climate
conflict and/or security in the literature. By investigating frameworks of meanings
ascribed to vulnerability, using a more nuanced and less subjective
vulnerability interpretation diagnostic tool, the study demonstrates how
different interpretations of vulnerability may encourage or shape a
particular climate conflict discourse.
The main research motivation draws largely from Gemenne et al.'s (2014) call
regarding the need to re-embed the notion of vulnerability as a function of
power into the discourses on climate and conflict in order to increase the
prospect of explaining better the climate conflict links. This paper
therefore asks the following:
How are the different discourses of climate change and conflict
constructed and represented in peer-reviewed articles?
How is vulnerability portrayed across discourse lines and how does this
influence the discursive formation of climate change and conflict issues?
How may we frame climate conflict as a vulnerability-based question and
what new knowledge can we anticipate with this framing (e.g. for guiding
climate, land use, and conflict research)?
Interpretations of vulnerability in climate change impact studies
(based on Füssel and Klein, 2006; Füssel, 2007; Kelly and Adger,
2000; O'Brien et al., 2004, 2007).
Outcome interpretationContextual interpretationPrioritised meaning ofExtent to which expected net climate changeCurrent susceptibility to climate change and variability asvulnerabilitymay harm a particular systeminfluenced by multiple factors and processesTemporal referenceFuture vulnerability to climate impacts;Present vulnerability and adaptation to current climateadaptation to future climate changevariability and changeFramingScientific framing of the climate changeHuman security framing based on actor-system view (natureproblem based on physical-flows (the state ofand society are inseparable aspects of the same context)nature) viewEntry point of analysisProjections of future emission trends andCurrent climatic, biophysical and contextual conditionsscenarios of future climate hazardsdriving vulnerabilityVulnerability approachIntegrated, risk hazardPolitical economy, social or intrinsic vulnerabilityVulnerability andAdaptive capacity determines vulnerabilityVulnerability determines adaptive capacityadaptive capacity linksPolicy contextClimate change mitigation, compensation,Social and economic adaptations, reduce inequalities,technological and sectoral adaptationspromote sustainable developmentLogic of vulnerability interpretations
Vulnerability is commonly understood as the susceptibility of people to the
harmful consequences of (climatic) shocks or stressors, yet various
underlying interpretations are ascribed to it in the climate impact
literature. The interpretations come under a variety of labels, e.g. “end
point”, “starting point” and “focal point” interpretations (Kelly and
Adger, 2000), as well as “outcome” and “contextual” interpretations
(O'Brien et al., 2007). In O'Brien et al.'s (2007) writing, end point and
starting point interpretations convey the same meanings as outcome and
contextual vulnerability interpretations respectively. A review of what
these different terms mean shows that there are generally two main
interpretations (Table 1); although there could be another interpretation
that falls between the end point and starting point of a vulnerability
assessment. Füssel and Klein (2006, p. 305) refer to this as “an
intermediate element” of vulnerability portrayal.
Vulnerability according to the end point or outcome interpretation is
focused on estimates of potential (net) climate change impacts, taking into
account possible (future) adaptive responses. It represents a linear result
or outcome of a sequence of analyses that involves projections of future
emission trends, development of climate scenarios, biophysical impact
evaluations, and identification of adaptation options (Kelly and Adger,
2000). This interpretation orients towards a static quantification of
biophysical vulnerability, and relates to the level of susceptibility that
is observed after adaptation has taken place (Hopkins, 2014). Vulnerability
assessment based on this interpretation provides a convenient means of
differentiating between net and gross climate impacts through estimates of
feasible adaptations. Füssel (2007) reveals this interpretation is
grounded in the integrated or risk-hazard vulnerability framework and is
relevant for mitigation and compensation policies (i.e. the assistance high
CO2 emitting nations offer countries who disproportionally suffer from
climate impacts), and for advancing technical adaptations (e.g. irrigation
schemes, supply of drought-tolerant seed varieties or structural
improvements in housing).
The starting point or contextual interpretation, in contrast, presents
vulnerability as a “present” lack of capacity to cope or adapt to changing
climate conditions. It considers vulnerability as a condition generated by
multiple factors and processes, and focuses on social and ecological systems
(O'Brien et al., 2007). This interpretation suggests that the starting point
to understanding climate change problems in societies should be based on the
locations and land use context in which climate variability and change
occur. The context entails a multidimensional view of climate and society
interactions, which may draw upon climatic, biophysical, and other contextual
conditions (i.e. social, economic, political and institutional structures
and dynamics), consistent with the political ecology framework of
vulnerability, and the entitlements, local livelihoods and social capital
literature (Leach et al., 1999). This interpretation is relevant for
explaining how intrinsic (dynamic) vulnerability determines adaptive
capacities and adaptations, and for addressing broader social development issues.
Vulnerability according to the “focal point” idea represents an
overarching concept or goal that a particular vulnerability study seeks to
address. It reflects the course of a particular vulnerability analysis. It
is more like an indicator for identifying other interpretations of
vulnerability. Relating “focal point” to the food security and natural
hazards literature, Kelly and Adger (2000) make reference to the space of
vulnerability in terms of exposure, risk, and capacity to cope with stress,
including the consequences of stress and the associated risks of slow
recovery. The focal point indicates whether a study is concerned about
current, future or dynamic vulnerability of climate impacts (Füssel,
2007); sectoral sensitivities, political economy or multiple stressors
(O'Brien et al., 2007); or concerned about “intermediate elements” that lie
between outcome and contextual interpretations (Füssel and Klein, 2006).
Because of its indicative nature, the “focal point” notion is often not
considered as a type of vulnerability interpretation.
Outcome and contextual interpretations of vulnerability differ in their
descriptions of vulnerability, temporal reference and framing, starting
point of analysis, vulnerability approach, adaptation-vulnerability links
and policy contexts (Table 1). Although none of the interpretations is
considered more or less appropriate than another in the context of climate
impacts research (Kelly and Adger, 2000), contextual vulnerability can be
more apt for studying current vulnerability to the social impacts of climate
change, such as conflict and violence. Differences in interpretations are
often emphasised to guide climate impact assessment studies and to
demonstrate the need for studies to be explicit and transparent in the
interpretation of vulnerability.
Analytical approach
The term “discourse” is subject to a diverse array of definitions.
Broadly, it is understood as a shared way of apprehending or constructing
reality (Dryzek, 2005) or as Hajer (1995, 44–45) puts it – “a specific
ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced,
reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through
which meaning is given to physical and social realities”. It contains “a
corpus of expressions in which we can find homogeneity in messages as well
as in expressive means” (Adger et al., 2001, p. 685). Discourses structure
issues in distinct ways, define what is acceptable as “true” by society,
and invoke significant power effects within a particular framework of
practices (Detraz, 2011; McDonald, 2013; Ide and Fröhlich, 2015).
Because they influence perceptions and interpretations of a phenomenon (and
an action) by emphasising the autonomy of the acting individual and/or institution
(Müller, 2008), they can be dynamic or static, dominant (when their core
statements are widely accepted as true by a large majority of society) or
relegated, and can be communicated in various concrete forms (e.g. through
written or oral statements) (Doulton and Brown, 2009). These different
perceptions offer a robust support for viewing “climate-conflict
discourses” as shared assumptions and contentions about climate change and
conflict links, which apparently often coalesce into a range of singular
norms with common themes.
Analytical approach for discourse analysis of climate conflict
peer-reviewed articles.
Surface and/or external descriptorsThese recognise the title, abstract, and keywords of the articleCentral entities and/or issues recognisedThis specifies the ontology of the issue; how climate-conflict phenomena areor constructedunderstood; the role of climate in conflict; the referent object beingthreatened; definition of the nature of the threat; and the scientific evidenceexpressed based on contextAssumptions about causality andThe likely linkages and impacts of climate change on conflicts acrossmechanistic relationshipsdifferent scales; the degree of uncertaintyNormative judgementsPerceptions of responses for dealing with climate threats, policy prescriptionson social impacts; extent to which the issue should be a priorityVulnerability portrayalFraming of meanings ascribed to vulnerability in discourses
Adapted from Adger et al. (2001), Dryzek (2005) and
McDonald (2013).
Note: no consideration of actors producing, reproducing, and transforming a
particular discourse, including agents' interests/motives – these aspects
can be explicitly defined in voice or speech dimensions of discourses.
Similarly, there is no focus on “expressive means” such as rhetorical
devices deployed to convince readers by putting climate threats in a
particular light – newspaper articles do this well, not peer-reviewed
articles (e.g. see Doulton and Brown, 2009).
A discourse approach explores commonalities across multiple discourses
competing to shape the way people, communities and authorities engage with a
particular issue, including the dynamics of that competition. It provides
insight into the interplay of messages, narrative and/or argumentative structures
and policy perceptions (Rafey and Sovacool, 2011). Several approaches to
discourse analysis in the environmental realm follow the works of
Michel Foucault (1979, 1991). His exploration of social phenomena is often
presented as classic in approaches to discourse analysis (usually in the
frame of “regimes of practices” and power and/or knowledge nexus), pointing to the
need to construct critical narratives of distinct stories of `realities'
that constitute a discourse (Hewitt, 2009). Inspired by Foucault's idea,
Hajer (1995) provides insights concerning this aspect, particularly in
relation to what should constitute the objects and/or elements of a discourse
analysis, e.g. metaphor, storyline, and discourse coalitions. He suggests
that everything we perceive as discourses, which influence how societies
engage with an issue (e.g. climate change), should be analysed in the
context in which they are discursively constructed. McDonald (2013) for
example, has focused on the use of textual and speech storylines and/or dimensions
based on insights from Hajer's (1995) writings in his critical
synthesis and/or analysis of discourses of climate security. Ideas from these
previous studies inform our analytical approach for climate conflict
discourses. Specifically, we focus on units of textual communications for
climate conflict storylines using distinct categories of discourse
components (i.e. sets of key discourse elements – Table 2) drawn from a
synthesis of the fundamental discourse components outlined by Adger et al. (2001),
Dryzek (2005) and McDonald (2013) for the analysis of the broad
sweep of environmental security discourses. Similar to Doulton and Brown
(2009), we find the discourse components (Table 2) framework particularly
useful for a more explicit portrayal of the basic storylines across
different climate conflict discourses, and also because they give a less
subjective basis from which to assess discourse lines. Although this study
does not emphasise the range of actors articulating a particular discourse
or the political agenda they pursue, it nonetheless recognises dominant
discourses and the vulnerability thinking that they encourage.
To investigate the framework of meanings ascribed to vulnerability, in
particular how interpretations of vulnerability enable or constrain the ways
in which climate conflict relation is understood, we develop a vulnerability
interpretation diagnostic tool (VIDT), based on Füssel (2007) and
O'Brien et al. (2007). The tool (Table 3) uses illustrative research
questions, focal points, methods, and policy suggestions that appear in the
body of texts as clues to deduce the particular vulnerability
interpretations implied. The study demonstrates that the tool can be
usefully employed for more specific issues such as climate and conflict, and
in the identification of the variables that feed into any sequence of
climate conflict analysis.
Diagnostic tool for identifying different interpretations of
vulnerability in climate conflict research (partly based on
Füssel, 2007 and O'Brien et al., 2007).
Outcome vulnerabilityContextual vulnerabilityIllustrative research questionsAre human activities contributing to global warming andIs climate change a relevant securityinsecurity? What are the expected net impacts of climateproblem? Why are some groups more affectedchange and conflict in different regions?by climate-induced conflict than others?Focal points/starting point ofFuture implications of climate change on security andPast and current climate variability andanalysisconflict; scenarios of potential climate change and conflictchange interactions with conflict; livelihoods,interactions, dynamic cross-scale integrated assessmentspolitical economy, place-based and internalcontextual issues (multiple factors andprocesses)MethodsSimulations/scenario based approaches; integratedLongitudinal, cross-sectional surveys,assessment modelshousehold surveys, quantitative/qualitativecase studies, context-specific indicatorapproachesPolicy recommendationsReduce GHG emissions, technical and sectoral adaptations,Address local constraints in vulnerable areasprevent trading in arms, securitisation/militarisation ofthrough direct aids, conflict preventiveclimate change etc.actions, building socio-economic adaptationcapacities, promoting internal conflictresolution, supporting livelihood security etc.
Article selection criteria.
The scholarly interest of the article is on the interactions between climate change and conflict or securityThe article is focused on climate causes only or a combination of location-specific climatic and contextual issues, or the article questionsand denies the rationale for a climate connection in conflict outcomes (articles showing mixed, unclear ideas were excluded)The article is peer-reviewed and published between 2007 and 2015Articles in which the keyword “vulnerability” is mentioned, either explicitly or implicitly, at least once in the title, abstract, keywords or inthe entire text, excluding the reference list (Desktop Mendeley Reference Manager enabled the screening of texts depictingvulnerability/vulnerabilities)The article is widely available in English and accessible through electronic media (either by an open access or subscription only platform orboth) to readers from various backgrounds
This research uses peer-reviewed sources as the focus of analysis – because
they are based on original research, convey credibility and provide reliable
insights (including their relative ease of analysis) (Atkinson et al.,
2015). Searches for articles were based on a close examination of articles
that suitably meet the criteria specified in Table 4. We used the search
terms “climate change and conflict” OR “climate conflict” OR “climate
violence” OR “climate security” AND “vulnerability” to screen the Web of
Science (WoS) and Scopus databases based on Title, Abstract and Keywords, and “climate,
violence, security, conflict, vulnerability” on the Google Scholar (GS) search engine. The
search process covered the period 2007 to 2015 (last access: 11 August 2015).
This time frame covers a period when issues about climate security and
conflict became markedly pronounced as a subject of growing international
public concern, especially following the publication of two
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports (IPCC, 2007, 2014).
Similarly, this period allows for an in-depth engagement with advances in
climate conflict issues, particularly in terms of whether and how
vulnerability had become an integral part of the discourses/analyses. The
search process resulted in a database of 34 articles that articulate climate
conflict links and that made reference to vulnerability following the
criteria outlined in Table 4.
We utilise Tables 2 and 3 to analyse each selected article to more precisely
detect the range of discourses depicting homogeneity in stances. Our
approach evidently demarcates what represents a particular way of viewing
climate-conflict ideas. The identified stances and discourses are presented
in Sect. 4. Each discourse is described by using illustrative quotes, basic
storylines, and a brief outline of the discourse components and/or contents.
Typology of climate conflict discourses and associated stances
across the peer-reviewed sources.
Discourse linesStances*For “climate conflict”Climate change is a “threat multiplier”, an “accelerant of instability”.Climatic determinismClimatic conditions and events directly influence the propensity for violent conflict (Burke et al.,2009; Hsiang et al., 2011).Context centrismIndirect linkages demonstrate that the “state of nature” and “nature of the state” are inseparableaspects of the same context across different scales (Raleigh et al., 2014).– National security threatThreats from the manifestations of climate change will challenge the sovereignty, territorialintegrity and institutional capacity of the nation-state, undermining the national “way of life”(Busby, 2008; Morales Jr., 2015).– Human security threatThe poor are powerless victims; climate change will drive human insecurity and violentconfrontations by shrinking the resource base anchoring livelihoods and by undermining politicaland economic stability (Zografos et al., 2014).– International security threatClimate change is likely to cause planetary upheavals (Brown and McLeman, 2009).– Ecological security threatClimate change will accelerate (negative) systematic structural change in people–biosphererelationship, and undermine moral obligation humans have to preserve plants, animal species andother living beings (McDonald, 2013).Against “climate conflict”Branding conflict as an outcome of climate change is misleading and fails to address theideological variables driving conflict.Denial claims/detachedConflict is a social issue/construct, its drivers have no link with climate change (Selby, 2014).
* Grouping in this format tries to pull together various related stances into
singular norms about climate-conflict outcomes using a discursive
homogenisation or coalition perspective similar to
Rafey and Sovacool (2011). Climate security is
not freedom from climate threats, but a way to express the risks and threats
posed by climate change: conflict and violence make this expression clearer
in terms of the meanings inferred.
Characterising discourses of climate conflict
Nine general stances regarding interactions between climate change and
conflict were identified from the taxonomy of discourses present in the
peer-reviewed sources. The stances differ in their arguments “for” and
“against” considerations of climate change as a security issue (or as a
threat multiplier). The stances arguing for climate conflict (seven stances
in all) affirms a security threat position across different scales. One specific stance with
a climate-centric viewpoint suggests that climatic conditions and events directly and
dominantly influence conflict and violence. Another stance based on a
context-centric narrative affirms indirect linkages through a confluence of factors which
evidently differ across different scales (national, human, global, and
ecological), particularly in terms of what may constitute “the state of
nature” and the “nature of the state” across varying contexts. Next comes
the opposing stances (two stances in all) – which hold that conflict under
climatic trends is a social construct, and that climatic changes need not be
characterised as a security issue. The stances and the discourses linked to
them are outlined in Table 5. All shades of conflict and violence types,
including climatic stressors, events, and extremes are considered in
categorising the discourses. We focused predominantly on the textual
dimensions and practices of communicating and reinforcing discourses. Our
categorisation does not include a neutral stance, i.e. messages that are somewhat
ambivalent about the climate conflict issue.
Discourse 1: climatic determinism
Large deviations from normal precipitation and mild temperatures
systematically increase the risk of many types of conflict, often
substantially (Hsiang et al., 2013, p. 1).
Temperature variables are strongly related to conflict
incidence … with a 1 ∘C increase in
temperature … leading to a 4.5 % increase in civil
war … (Burke et al., 2009, p. 20 670).
Climatic determinism demonstrates that warming climates influence irritability, aggression, and
violent intergroup conflicts. Central to this discourse is a thermal stress
hypothesis grounded in research mainly from psychology of social conflict
and aggression (Anderson and DeLisi, 2011). In particular, extant studies
that use quantitative methods to link conflict to climate in global or
regional data sets affirm that heat and aggression are closely linked by
illustrating that physically uncomfortably hot conditions (e.g. during El
Niño events) can increase the likelihood of physical aggression and
violent conducts (Hsiang et al., 2011). This discourse prescribes an almost
instant “conflict” response to thermal extremes and represents a world view
in which climate change is conceived as a dominant factor in, and a key
entry point to the climate conflict storyline. By promoting a direct effect
of uncomfortably warm temperatures on conflict and violence, and therefore
placing climate trends as the central focus, the discourse evidently
suggests a modern form of “biophysical or environmental determinism”
(Raleigh et al., 2014). Indeed, the discourse draws upon enlightenment
ideals of positivist science to suggest that more knowledge about the
dynamic climate/biophysical/land use systems will enable humankind to better
mitigate climate impacts, and cope with social conditions such as conflict escalations.
Discourse 2: context centrism
Political and economic, rather than climatic factors, can be a key source
of human insecurity (Zografos et al., 2014, p. 335).
The context centrism discourse in which the notions of human, national, global, and ecological
security are apart, is often cast from a deterministic storyline that
encourages viewing climate change as a threat to the extent that it
precipitates threats across diverse scales (Detraz, 2011; McDonald, 2013).
In the frame of political ecology and neo-Malthusian perspectives, it embeds
the subjects whose security is threatened, including specific causal
mechanisms, as a central premise to offer support for connections between
climate change and conflict. Specifically, it is concerned about tracing
multi-level linkages, including decision-making, governance, and hierarchies
of power (Kallis and Zografos, 2014). Statements pointing to climate change
as fuelling more droughts and famine, more forced migration and/or mass
displacement, hikes in food prices, scarcities of resources anchoring human
livelihoods, land use changes, and negative changes in economic growth are
often invoked to explain how climate change drives conflicts and violence
(Gemenne et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). Generally, studies articulating a
context-centric view emphasise that (i) climate-conflict links are multi-directional,
i.e. there is not a simple one-way connection, (ii) several themes and variables
are involved, pointing to climate change as one of a range of factors in
conflict outcomes, (iii) sub-Saharan Africa and southern and/or central Asia
present potential locations where evidence is most stark, and (iv) climate
change is associated with low level conflicts. The discourse concentrates on
what must be done to address some known drivers of conflict under climatic
changes to create resilient societies (Dumaine and Mintzer, 2015).
Discourse 3: denial claims
Climate change … need not be characterised as fundamentally a security
issue (Gartzke, 2012, p. 177).
Quantifications of climate conflict links are of dubious value, since they
inevitably rest upon coding and modelling premises that are arbitrary and
sometimes even untenable (Selby, 2014, p. 20).
… scholars who study conflict itself are less persuaded by the importance of
climate as a factor in outbreak of conflict … (King and Mutter, 2014, p. 1248).
Denial claims discourse does not deny climate change, nor imply that its influence will
not be problematic. Rather, it questions the existence or severity of
climate change impacts on conflict outcomes, insisting that claims about
climate conflict are insufficiently supported by scientific evidence (Slow,
2013). Most studies here either establish “no link” (Gartzke, 2012; Koubi
et al., 2012), demonstrate “little evidence” (Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014)
or view climate conflict predictions with scepticism (see Mason and Zeitoun,
2013). This discourse draws mostly upon a philosophical and/or traditional security
type of thinking that presents conflict as a social construct, a somewhat
“militarised framing” or “heterodox idea” that is critical to claims
about relations between environment/climate and conflict (Deudney, 1990). By
constructing realities based on a combination of historical antecedence and
current economic, political and cultural contexts, the discourse argues for
a need to explore conflict in more complex ways than simply pointing to
climate change, and suggests tackling more pressing challenges such as
terrorism, HIV and poverty that plague Third World countries (Selby, 2014; Floyd, 2015).
Summary of the different discourses showing key similarities and differences.
Discourses and exampleCentral issues recognisedAssumptions about causalityNormative judgementVulnerability portrayalreferencesClimatic determinismState of nature; biophysical systemsVulnerability does not usually give any(Burke et al., 2009;Climate conflict is a challenge; positivistClimatic reductionism: certainRich countries must lead emissions cuts to mitigateexplicit meaning; when mentioned itHendrix and Salehyan,epistemology and quantitative methods show it willclimate extremes bring hotter andimpactstends to convey a notion of fragile2012; Hsiang et al., 2011,worsen violencedrier weather – represent a model forplaces; of conflict outcomes from2013; Devlin andconflict and violencePrecautionary peace measuresexposure to given levels of globalHendrix, 2014)changeVulnerable people – subjects to be protected in the faceof climate extremesSuggests that knowledge about thedynamic climate system will enablehumankind mitigate climate change andreduce conflicts and vulnerabilitiesContext centrismDangerous climate change a threat on humanChanges in food supplies and/or prices;Peace building, disaster risk reduction strategiesVulnerability – influenced by changing(Ludwig et al., 2011;survival; livelihoods, communities, and culturespowerless victims are in developingbiophysical conditions, dynamic socio-Mason et al., 2011;under threatcountrieseconomic, political, institutional andFjelde and von Uexkull,technological structures and processes2012; Meierding, 2013;Kallis and Zografos,Relevance of territorial borders, sovereignty, andPopulations displaced by resourceIncorporate climate conflict concerns into nationalImplicitly refers to contextual2014; Vivekananda et al.,institutional capacity in national securityviolence are a threat to states;intelligent assessment and/or military planning; defencevulnerability by linking vulnerability to2014; Ide, 2015; Raleighestablishments and/or military to respond to threatsconditions of insecurity andet al., 2015)Climate change undermines state capacity to prepareIf fragile states become resilient andpowerlessness (e.g. Gemenne et al.,for and/or carry out security responsibilitiespolitically stable, they will be betterNeed for mitigation and adaptation and/or focus on threat2014)able to resist violenceminimisersBigger ever threat to planetary survivalGlobal demographic changes andClose watch on borders to prevent damaging spill overSuggests linking vulnerability to themass migration crises will increaseeffect of climate conflict and/or violencecontext in which humans live to revealenvironmental pressure globallycomplex nuances in climate conflictlinks (e.g. Von Uexkull, 2014)Ecological balance, natural equilibrium threatenedEquilibrium exists betweenChallenge norms encouraging environmentalHow scarcity or abundance lead toconsumption levels of humandegradationconflict is contingent on the mannerpopulations and nature's ability toconditional (pre-existing) vulnerabilityprovide resources and/or servicesExtend moral obligation to ecological sustainabilityplay out (e.g. Koubi et al., 2013)Ecological crises linked to climateand human practicesDenial claimsClimate conflict evidence unclearExplanatory pathways unreliableDeep concern for sustainable developmentNo attention is given to the notion of(Buhaug, 2010;vulnerability but conflict is conceivedHartmann, 2010; Gartzke,Increasing uncertainty about the security and/or conflictRobust models non-existent; mereClimate conflict concern will militarise provision ofto be the outcome of weak structures2012; Gleditsch, 2012;consequences of climate changerhetoric and/or speculations – reflect andevelopment assistance (i.e. misdirect assistance toand processes inherent in a particularKoubi et al., 2012;ensemble of Northern ideologiesdefence establishments), provide ammunition for“vulnerable unit”, and less from externalTheisen et al., 2012;Understand conflict in more complex ways rathervarious powerful elites and distort climate policyclimate stressors; contextualSelby, 2014; Wischnaththan through climate changevulnerability is suspected from the focaland Buhaug, 2014)Pay less attention to scaremongerspoint of the discourse
Table 6 gives a summary of the different discourses, showing key
similarities and differences, and how they are constructed using the central
entities and/or issues recognised, the assumptions about causality and mechanistic
relationships, normative judgements inferred and vulnerability portrayals.
Although the constructed discourses differ considerably in their
conceptualisation of the roles of climate change in conflict events, we
observed, as have others (e.g. Ide and Scheffran, 2014; O'Loughlin et al.,
2014; Buhaug, 2015), that studies within particular discourses – in
particular the quantitative climate-centric and context-centric studies – also differ in the conclusions
and policy suggestions they provide. This is explained by the (i) varied
climate and conflict data sets used, (ii) different quantitative and
qualitative definitions and scope of conflict employed, (iii) different
climate change parameters, (iv) benchmark model specifications
(i.e. modelling problems), including varied evaluation and statistical procedures,
and (v) choice of spatial scales and theories.
Portrayals of vulnerability across climate conflict discourse lines
… much of the emerging climate security discourse contains elements of early
environmental security research which many critics have found to be
problematic (Jasparro and Taylor, 2008, p. 237).
“Vulnerability” is mentioned much less frequently in peer-reviewed
evidence for and against climate conflict. However, there are differences
across discourse lines. For example, the somewhat “direct link” premise
upon which the climatic determinism discourse is based ordinarily seems to de-emphasise
vulnerability, indirectly implying that previously recorded incidences of
climate conflict may not have happened because an entity between changes in
climate and onset of conflict is vulnerable. Nonetheless, based on the VIDT
approach, we note that references to the state of nature and a biophysical
frame shift the discourse towards a vulnerability description that suggests
an outcome interpretation. This position is particularly evident in
assessments where the probability of conflicts arising is linked to a single
net climatic event (e.g. Hsiang et al., 2011). As vulnerability is generally
given less explicit consideration, it is highly likely that the discursive
formation of climatic determinism has progressed without attention to conditional elements
shaping vulnerability.
This position is in sharp contrast to a context centrism discourse where discussions about
vulnerability often invoke the contexts in which humans live or the
boundaries in which states operate (Barnett and Adger, 2007). In high-risk regions of Africa where climate change impacts are far-reaching and
where contextual conditions imply weakness, vulnerability is interpreted in
the language of insecurity and presented as a condition of powerlessness
(Gemenne et al., 2014). This discourse emphasises that climate change not
only causes conflict through resource scarcities or a decline in national
incomes, but by increasing human and national vulnerabilities. Indeed,
climate change produces its effects more within extremely vulnerable systems
(Sherbinin, 2014).
Broadly, vulnerability is conceived as occurring and increasing conflict
outcomes of climate change when and where individuals, communities and
states lack the capacities necessary to end internal and external
vulnerability drivers (Busby et al., 2014a; Kallis and Zografos, 2014).
Adger's (2010) writing is a good example of how vulnerability is portrayed
here, particularly through a human security framing. It is the consideration
of human security – in terms of conditions that make people susceptible to
harms under climate change (e.g. ecological marginalisation, deprivation,
disempowerment) – that makes the inclusion of vulnerability in contextual
climate conflict studies richer and more meaningful. As climate change is
more relevant for human security and low-level conflicts than for other
security types (Floyd, 2008, 2015), reference to contextual vulnerability is
most visible in studies that follow a human security frame.
Context centric discourse shows that interpreting vulnerability in the notion of contextual
dynamics can reveal the complex nuances of vulnerability, and also of
climate conflict interactions. One facet of this complexity presents
vulnerability as a potential transformative process (O'Brien et al., 2007),
implying that it could be beneficial if it leads to the creation of positive
strategies for better governance, resilience, adaptability or peace
building, particularly in conflict-prone communities facing climate
extremes. On the other hand, it can be negative if it reverses moves towards
peace and cooperation by increasing conflicts and social instability. The
positive transformative aspect of vulnerability is particularly silent in
this discourse because vulnerability is widely viewed as “bad news”, as
providing space for climate change to thrive and inflict harms on humankind
(Adger, 2010). Because the discourse of context centrism emphasises that climate conflict
cannot be separated from contextual factors driving vulnerability (which are
often unique to every society), it is possible that portrayals of
vulnerability as a contextual issue may have played a role in shaping the
various stances associated with this discourse.
Denial claims is the most robust of the discourses in terms of vulnerability
considerations. Similar to the context centrism discourse, this discourse conceives conflict
as an element of social vulnerability, emanating from structures and
processes inherent in a particular “vulnerable unit” and less from
“external climatic forces”. It recognises internal contextual variables
that often shape outcomes of, and responses to, conflicts under climate
change, and thus gives room to suspect a contextual vulnerability
interpretation. This position is implied, albeit implicitly, in key studies
such as those by Bergholt and Lujala (2012), Koubi et al. (2012), and Buhaug
et al. (2014).
Although context centrism and denial claims discourses are seen as supporting a contextual vulnerability
portrayal in expounding the role of climate change in conflict, whether and
how vulnerability is portrayed seems likely to also depend on the country
from which a particular study originates. Schafer et al. (2016) show that
studies grounded in western countries strongly focus on national and global
security/conflict and often give limited attention to the notion of
vulnerability. In contrast, studies from developing and/or emerging economies place
greater emphasis on human security (and to key resources such as water, land,
and food as important catalysts), and therefore tend to give more attention
to vulnerability (Zografos et al., 2014). Similarly, as more disaggregated
sub-national studies have gained traction in recent years (Raleigh and
Kniveton, 2012; Papaioannou, 2016), and as “qualitative-focused studies”
demonstrate a more engaging link with issues around vulnerability
(especially by paying attention to the uniqueness of individual locations
and their power dynamics concerning access and governance of public
resources, including communal land; Adger et al., 2013), it is likely that
contextual vulnerability considerations will become more central to climate
conflict scholarship.
Advancing the notion of contextual vulnerability
… estimating a model without consideration of specific locations of violence
across a large region over a long time period hides a myriad of contextual
conditions (O'Loughlin et al., 2012, p. 18 347).
… to enhance specification of theoretical arguments … maintenance of the
recent emphasis on conditional effects … is necessary (Meierding, 2013, p. 185).
The recent rise in calls to pin down more subtle and complex indirect causal
mechanisms and contexts “under which climatic events plausibly may have a
measurable impact on conflict dynamics” (Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 396)
reflect an increasing sense of contextual vulnerability. Arguably,
vulnerability in the totality of its meaning cannot be suitably portrayed in
climate conflict research without reference to context and dynamism. Such a
position was already apparent in studies from Scheffran et al. (2012a),
Adger et al. (2013), Busby et al. (2014b), Ide et al. (2014) and Wischnath
and Buhaug (2014), which largely endorse a context centrism discourse frame. The most
immediate insight here illustrates that it is preferable to say that to
understand climate conflict relations is to understand nuanced and
context-sensitive intervening factors. Halvard Buhaug (2015, p. 271)
captures the fundamental nature of this position, suggesting that:
… there is no mechanistic link between the environment and society that
dictates the same social response to a climatic phenomenon across contexts.
Societies differ with respect to environmental vulnerability, coping
capacity and ability to adapt, and also with respect to exogenously defined
drivers of latent conflict risk.
The imperatives of contextual vulnerability increasingly challenge a
deterministic narrative of scarcity-induced conflict (Selby and Hoffmann,
2014). They redefine the way we think about the subtle patterns certain
climatic conditions and extremes (e.g. El Niño events) relate to
conflicts in practice (Koubi et al., 2013). Expanding climate conflict
research to incorporate knowledge of contextual vulnerability processes and
directionality does not require great conceptual or analytical stretching
(Brown and McLeman, 2009). As has been echoed in the environmental security
and vulnerability literature, locational climate conflict and vulnerability
share similar structural determinants: poverty, fractured social and
political structures, and resource depletion (Adger et al., 2013). The
breadth and scope of these are most powerfully advanced in the analytical
framework proposed by Scheffran et al. (2012b), which draws upon
environmental (e.g. ecosystem damage, biodiversity losses, etc.) and human
(e.g. livelihood losses, asset depletions, etc.) vulnerabilities as key
elements of contextual vulnerability in tracing pathways among the climate
system, natural resources, human security, and social stability. Similarly,
the climate security vulnerability hot spot study conducted by Busby et al. (2014a, b)
points to locations where a large number of people could possibly
die under climate conflict events by highlighting a repertoire of
explanatory variables. For Brown and McLeman (2009, p. 294), “the
identification of security risks and the prevention of conflict due to the
impacts of climate change can be considered strongly linked to the
identification of regions or populations that are vulnerable to climate
change because of inadequate adaptive capacity”. These studies advance
variables that matter and explain why the security consequences of climate
change are a “big” issue in some locations and less at other places.
Further, Papaioannou's (2016) disaggregated, sub-national study presents a
detailed scoping assessment of contextual conditions that provide a robust
qualitative and quantitative evidence for climate shocks in conflict
mechanisms. Several other studies also show the distinctive manner in which
contextual vulnerability assessment can offer explanatory power to support
distinct causal pathways and dynamics (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012;
Zografos et al., 2014).
Given that contextual vulnerability represents dominant portrayal of
vulnerability in climate conflict studies, and offers a promising entry
point for analysts, researchers, and policy-makers aiming for a robust
disentangling of the climate conflict nexus, we find reasons to advocate a
framing of climate conflict as a vulnerability-based question that orients
towards a needs-based agenda advanced in Raleigh et al. (2014). Such an
agenda seeks to rescale the debate “bottom-upward” to highlight
specificity and differences, and to combine threat-centred thinking and
rhetoric about dangers emanating from climate shocks with a discourse along
simplistic contextual vulnerability lines (Jasparro and Taylor, 2008).
Specifically, it asks what makes people vulnerable; questioning the
trajectories of conditional forces at the root of social tensions (such as
spatialities of economic and geopolitical powers driving, for example,
strategic resource manoeuvring over e.g. land), which for Adger et al. (2013)
is one overlooked dimension. Casting climate conflict as a
vulnerability-based question, therefore, supports making vulnerability and
adaptability the central analytical issues (Adger, 2010). It orients the
research towards fundamentally rebalancing the missing synergy between the
climate science and social science communities (see Lewis and Lenton, 2015)
and suggests taking into account the deterministic storyline regarding
causes of peace and cooperation under climate change (Gemenne et al., 2014).
Indeed, the considerable range of knowledge this can generate has been
voiced (Slow, 2013; King and Mutter, 2014), especially in the hope for more
convergence and consensual results (Ide and Scheffran, 2014).
Overall, contextual vulnerability can support a constructivist
theory-informed climate conflict scholarship in three ways: (i) unravelling
contextual totalities (e.g. a turn towards contextualised political ecologies of
climate vulnerability-conflict pathways in which concrete socio-political
phenomena are analysed, including how “enclosure, territorialisation, and
market strategies of accumulation by dispossession” may drive conflicts
associated with land acquisition practices under climate change (Dunlap and
Fairhead, 2014, p. 19), (ii) highlighting historicity, specificity, and
variability (difference) of social structures and processes that seek to
resolve complexity rather than pursuing predictability; and
(iii) demonstrating flexibility in ways that incorporate contextual knowledge
across space and time, and that challenges existing order (Selby, 2014).
Further, a contextual vulnerability frame can enrich policies that are more
socially focused and that include options on resource diversification,
poverty reduction, conservation of common property resources, strengthening
of collective adaptation actions, and so on. These point to
resilience-building as an essential transformative process for areas
affected by climate conflict.
Reviewers noted a growing discursive shifts towards resilience as a key
nodal point in the climate conflict debate. Although this paper is not
concerned about which of resilience and vulnerability is dominant in climate
conflict debates, we observe that a shift towards resilience cannot
completely ignore discussions about vulnerability (Vivekananda et al.,
2014). Resilience and vulnerability are inextricably linked – since to
reduce vulnerability to climate conflict is to strengthen resilience (Busby
et al., 2014a). Indeed, vulnerability seems to have emerged alongside resilience
in climate conflict debates (Von Lucke et al., 2014). Considering differences in
research interests, we note that vulnerability seems to have relevance when
the focus is about understanding climate conflict transmission mechanisms or
facilitating factors (see Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Von Uexkull, 2014).
Resilience, in contrast, is stressed when the interest is about unpacking
and executing climate conflict (adaptive) solutions during and/or after a
violent event (Vivekananda et al., 2014). Similarly, studies emphasising
“migration” within the context centrism frame tend to invoke a discursive shift towards
resilience (e.g. Methmann and Oels, 2015). While we recognise the growing
interest in resilience thinking within the climate conflict debate, our
analysis suggests that it is the context centrism discourse frame that may best demonstrate
the resilience storyline.
Further, although our focus is mainly on contextual vulnerability, our
argument does not suggest that the outcome interpretation of vulnerability
will be irrelevant for climate conflict studies. Given the projected changes
in climate for several regions it is possible that most of what we know
about vulnerability “conditional factors” and processes in climate
conflict research will be insufficient to support our explanatory power of
future climate-conflict links (Lewis, 2013; Lewis and Lenton, 2015). This is
where outcome vulnerability might be useful. However, its limitation remains
its inability to capture gross climate impacts and social adaptations
(Füssel, 2007). Since climate conflict reflects a continuum of
conditional forces, a deeper diagnosis of current climate conflict
vulnerabilities can enable vulnerabilities to future climate conflict
conditions to be addressed.
Conclusions
Discourses of climate conflict serve to articulate the variety of
associations between climate change and conflict. The analysis presented
here illustrates that there are multiple ways of conceiving how discourses
are constructed, with different considerations for how climate conflict
phenomena should be understood, including assumptions about causality,
normative judgements, and vulnerability portrayals. While there is an absence
of a specific interpretation of vulnerability in much of the discourses, we
outline an orientation towards contextual vulnerability in both
context centrism and denial claims discourses.
This orientation is consistent with the portrayal of climate conflict as a
continuum of socially determined factors that coalesce around extremely
vulnerable systems. More importantly, as the somewhat “indirect link”
premise regarding climate conflict relations has found its way into popular
consciousness, we find most problematic the challenge associated with the
point of entry for interpretation of climate conflict links. Current
insights illustrate that a deterministic narrative of scarcity-induced
conflict and a “threat-centred” type of thinking can downplay the prospect
of pinning down more subtle interactions between climate change and
conflict. In this light, an inclination towards contextual vulnerability
offers a useful direction on how we might understand conflict in more
complex ways rather than through climate change. This idea invokes the
notion of contextual totalities, and embodies the complexity of the climate
conflict challenge in the frame of historicity, specificity and variability.
Similarly, the idea points to what may constitute parts of an integrative
framework's requirements for modelling pathways between climate change, land
use, and conflict (see Link et al., 2015).
Although the various discourses presented here have had a lot of purchase in
the public domain where security experts and climate change practitioners
speak different languages and consult different assessment tools, this paper
suggests that climate conflict discourses can be better portrayed as a flow
of socially constructed knowledge using a language that communicates
vulnerability and powerlessness. In this way climate conflict can be
presented as an issue that cuts across several disciplines, the type that
embraces theories across notions of access, control, and struggle in which
the precise and changing interactions of power, governance, institutions, and
investments are a part. Indeed, there is a need to integrate existing
knowledge within a contextual vulnerability perspective. It is our
contention that since much of climate conflict articles in the frame of
context centrism reveals a compelling priority for human security in Africa, casting the
climate conflict storyline as a vulnerability-based question would
re-enforce a needs-based agenda that allows for more convergence and
consensual argument for any area affected by climate conflict.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Michael Brzoska, Matt McDonald and two anonymous
reviewers for valuable comments on previous versions of this article.
Edited by: M. Brzoska
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